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Non-Technical Summary 
 
What is the best approach to modeling money? This question is one of those that economists have 
struggled with for a while, and is not yet settled.  
 
In this paper, we juxtapose two microfounded monetary models’ equilibrium predictions and their 
quantitative implications for the welfare cost of inflation: the model in Lagos and Wright (2005) 
(hereafter LW) and the cash-in-advance model in tradition of Lucas (1980, 1984). Proponents of the 
LW model view it as being theoretically more appealing than reduced-form models such as cash-
in-advance, and have argued that the model can generate significantly different quantitative 
results; e.g., the welfare costs of inflation are higher than in reduced-form models. 
 
The two models exhibit key similarities. In both models agents synchronously alternate between a 
centralized market and a decentralized market; consumption utility depends on the market in 
which the purchase is settled; adjustments of money balances are made before a random shock is 
observed. A key difference is the use of Nash bargaining in one model, but not the other: in the LW 
model, bargaining determines prices of cash trades, which induces a price distortion depending on 
the seller's bargaining power.  
 
Do these theoretical platforms predict different equilibrium allocations? Are these models 
generally incapable of producing similar quantitative results? What model features are responsible 
for possible disparities?  
 
Once the two frameworks are placed on equal footing, in terms of preferences, technologies, and 
shocks, we find that the equations characterizing stationary equilibrium in the LW model when 
sellers have no bargaining power coincide with the equations that characterize stationary 
competitive equilibrium in the cash-in-advance model. This also holds if sellers do have some 
bargaining power, when the price distortion from Nash bargaining is replicated in the other model 
via a tax on cash revenues. Such correspondence between equations immediately extends outside 
of steady-state, if sellers have no bargaining power and workers have isoelastic preferences; 
otherwise, the equations do not generally correspond. A quantitative exercise demonstrates that 
the welfare costs of inflation in the cash-in-advance model match those in the LW model. 
 
The message is that differences in the models’ main equations reduce to differences in the pricing 
mechanism assumed to govern those transactions that must be settled with the exchange of cash. 
For comparable preferences, technologies and shocks, differences in performance can be traced to 
the price distortion from bargaining. Two Monetary Models with Alternating Markets
Gabriele Camera† YiLi Chien‡
This version: 28 October 2013
Abstract
We present a thought-provoking study of two monetary models: the cash-in-advance and
the Lagos and Wright (2005) models. We report that the diﬀerent approach to modeling
money—reduced-form vs. explicit role—neither induces theoretical nor quantitative dif-
ferences in results. Given conformity of preferences, technologies and shocks, both models
reduce to one diﬀerence equation. The equations do not coincide only if price distortions are
diﬀerentially imposed across models. To illustrate, when cash prices are equally distorted
in both models equally large welfare costs of inﬂation are obtained in each model. Our
insight is that if results diﬀer, then this is due to diﬀerential assumptions about the pricing
mechanism that governs cash transactions, not the explicit microfoundation of money.
Keywords: cash-in-advance, matching, microfoundations, money, inﬂation.
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1 Introduction
The question “what’s the best approach to modeling money?” is one of those that
economists have struggled with for a while and is yet unsettled. Three decades ago,
some viewed the overlapping generations framework as the only satisfactory approach
to modeling money [5], while others saw merits from placing real balances in the utility
function and noted that such a device could be used to unify several results in the
literature [4,13]. These days, there is a lively debate about the framework proposed
in [7], in relation to reduced-form models of money.
Advocates of the LW model underscore its appeal as a tool for theoretical analysis
because, unlike reduced-form models, the role of money is made explicit [15, p.267].
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1This modeling approach contrasts with reduced-form models, such as those imposing
cash-in-advance constraints [8 12]. Yet, one may also note key similarities with the
cash-in-advance framework. In both models agents synchronously alternate between
a centralized market (CM) and a decentralized market (DM); consumption utility de-
pends on where the purchase is settled, in the DM or CM; and asset trading decisions
(adjustments of money balances, in particular) are made before a random shock is
observed; [10, p.10-11] and [7, pp.462-66]. It has also been argued that the explicit
microfoundation of money can make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for quantitative results;
in particular, it can generate higher welfare costs of inﬂation than reduced-form mod-
els [7, p.463-4].
These considerations have raised several questions among monetary economists.
Are there diﬀerences in the main equilibrium equations associated with these two
theoretical platforms? If so, what model features are responsible for such disparities?
Finally, are these two frameworks generally incapable of producing similar quantita-
tive results? We oﬀer some answers by discussing what we found when we juxtaposed
the models’ main equations and quantitative implications for the welfare cost of in-
ﬂation. We proceed as follows. Section 2 lays out the cash-in-advance framework
following [10], which has an explicit and transparent description of the physical envi-
ronment. Section 3 reports the main mathematical relationships describing equilib-
rium allocations in the LW model and identiﬁes the price distortion due to nonlinear
pricing. Unlike the cash-in-advance model, in the LW model Nash bargaining de-
termines prices in some transactions (which must be settled with the exchange of
money) but not others; hence, a price distortion may exist, depending on the seller’s
bargaining power. Subsequently, the two frameworks are placed on equal footing in
terms of preferences, technologies, and shocks. A way to introduce price distortions
in the cash-in-advance model without altering its fundamental structure is illus-
trated, which involves a tax on cash revenues. At this point, the equations describing
equilibrium allocations in the cash-in-advance model are derived.
2Our analysis mainly focuses on stationary equilibrium because the literature based
on the LW model has almost entirely focused on such equilibrium. We ﬁnd that the
equations characterizing stationary equilibrium in the LW model when sellers have no
bargaining power coincide with the equations that characterize stationary competitive
equilibrium in the cash-in-advance model. This also holds when sellers do have some
bargaining power, when the price distortion from Nash bargaining is replicated in
the other model. This is accomplished using a tax on cash revenues (equivalently, a
sales tax on cash purchases) but other distortionary mechanisms could be explored.
Such correspondence between equations immediately extends outside of steady-state,
if sellers have no bargaining power and workers have isoelastic preferences; otherwise,
a one-to-one mapping between the equations cannot be established outside of steady-
state. Hence, there may exist dynamical equilibria which are not the same in the two
models. Before concluding with Section 4 we propose a quantitative exercise, showing
that the welfare costs of inﬂation in the cash-in-advance model match those in the
LW model.
The main insight is thus that the two models (CIA, LW) reduce to a single dif-
ference equation. The equations correspond if the price distortion in one model is
matched in the other model, in which case one cannot distinguish one model from the
other based on their quantitative performance. The diﬀerences in the models’ main
equations reduce to diﬀerences in the pricing mechanism imposed in decentralized
markets. Hence, to the extent that the trading mechanism is not viewed as being an
integral part of the model, modeling money explicitly as opposed to imposing cash-in-
advance constraints neither induces theoretical nor quantitative diﬀerences in results.
The price mechanism assumed to govern those transactions that must be settled with
the exchange of cash is the source of diﬀerences. Overall, we think that our analysis
oﬀers an important pedagogical lesson in the quest for the “best approach to modeling
money.” On the one hand, it provides a unique perspective on the similarities in the
performance of two models of money that are often perceived as being very diﬀerent;
3on the other hand, it helps a reader to more deeply understand such models.
2 A cash-in-advance model
This section discusses a standard general-equilibrium macroeconomic environment
with incomplete markets. It is a compact version of the model in [10], where money
is introduced by means of cash-in-advance constraints. The model adopts the conven-
tion that agents periodically alternate between centralized and decentralized markets,
which is also found in the LW model.
Time is discrete and inﬁnite, denoted t = 0,1,... There is a constant population
composed of a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents, who are ex-ante homogeneous
and expected utility maximizers. Preferences are deﬁned over non-storable produced
goods and labor. Each agent owns equal shares in a representative ﬁrm that pro-
duces goods using the concave technology F, which has labor as the only factor of
production.
In a period, traders alternate synchronously between centralized and decentralized
markets. Each period is divided into two subperiods, say, morning and afternoon. A
decentralized market is open in the morning, while a centralized market is open in the
afternoon. To introduce money, it is assumed that some of the morning trades must
be settled immediately with the exchange of money (= cash trades) while others can
be settled in the afternoon (= credit trades). Goods purchased with cash are distinct
from goods purchased on credit, called goods 1 and 2, respectively. Money is injected
through lump-sum transfers by a central bank.
Let st denote a shock realized at the start of t. The shock which aﬀects the house-
holds’ ability to consume and produce cash goods is drawn from a time-invariant
set. Let {st}∞
t=0 denote a path of shocks and let St = (s1,...,st) denote a history of
shocks (from the set of all possible histories), which is known prior to all period t
trading. Let ft(St) denote the density of the history St. Neither F nor the money
4supply process depend on St.1 Events on date t evolve as follows.
Morning of t (≡ decentralized market) : The shock st is observed. Households
and ﬁrms trade goods 1 and 2, and labor. Households hold Mt(St−1) money and
buy c1t(St) goods in exchange for money (= cash goods), buy c2t(St) goods on credit
(=credit goods) and supply ht(St) labor to the ﬁrm on credit. The ﬁrm demands
hF
t (St) labor, buying it on credit, and supplies F(hF
t (St)) goods. Credit trades are
settled in the afternoon of t.
Afternoon of t (≡ centralized market) : Credit trades executed in the morning
of t are settled. Firms pay wages for work supplied in the morning and pay dividends
out of morning proﬁts. Households pay for credit goods bought in the morning. The
central bank retires the old money supply ¯ Mt−1 and issues a new money supply ¯ Mt
through lump-sum money transfers Θt to households. Trade on a ﬁnancial market
also takes place: households trade state-contingent claims to money to be delivered
in the afternoon of t + 1. Household exits the period holding Mt+1(St) money.
2.1 Firm and households’ optimal choices
On date t, given history St, the constraint of the ﬁrm is
F(h
F
t (S
t)) = c
F
1t(S
t) + c
F
2t(S
t) (1)
where cF
1t(St) and cF
2t(St) denote cash and credit goods. Because cash and credit
goods are distinct, let pjt(St) denote the nominal spot price of good j = 1,2 and let
wt(St) be the nominal spot wage on t. Nominal proﬁts (net dollar inﬂows) on the
morning of t are
p1t(S
t)c
F
1t(S
t) + p2t(S
t)c
F
2t(S
t) − wt(S
t)h
F
t (S
t), (2)
1A shock can also be added in the afternoon market, but since there are no such shocks in the
LW model, that case is not studied here. The order of opening of the markets can also be inverted,
without loss in generality.
5which are distributed as dividends in the afternoon.
Since the ﬁrm sells for cash and for credit, payments accrue as follows: in the morn-
ing, it receives cash payments for cash-goods sales, and in the afternoon it receives
payments for the morning’s credit sales. Let qt(St) denote the date−0 price of a claim
to one dollar delivered in the afternoon of t, contingent on St (= state-contingent nom-
inal bond). The ﬁrm’s date−0 proﬁt-maximization problem is: given state-contingent
prices qt(St), choose sequences of output and labor (cF
1t(St),cF
2t(St),hF
t (St)) to solve
Maximize:
∞ ∑
t=0
∫
qt(S
t)
{
p1t(S
t)c
F
1t(S
t) + p2t(S
t)c
F
2t(S
t) − wt(S
t)h
F
t (S
t)
}
dS
t
subject to: cF
1t(St) + cF
2t(St) = F(hF
t (St)).
(3)
Substituting for cF
1t(St) from the constraint, the FOCs for all t,St are
hF
t (St) : p1t(St)F ′(hF
t (St)) − wt(St) = 0
cF
2t(St) : p1t(St) − p2t(St) = 0.
Consequently, for all t,St we have p1t(St) = p2t(St) = pt(St) and
pt(S
t)F
′(h
F
t (S
t)) = wt(S
t). (4)
An agent who contracts on date 0 maximizes the expected utility
∞ ∑
t=0
βt
∫
U(c1t(S
t),c2t(S
t),ht(S
t))f
t(S
t)dS
t
where we assume U is a real-valued function, twice continuously diﬀerentiable in each
argument, strictly increasing in cj, decreasing in h, and concave. Maximization is
subject to two constraints. One is the cash in advance constraint
p1t(S
t)c1t(S
t) ≤ Mt(S
t−1) for all t and S
t,
where Mt(St−1) are money balances held at the start of t, brought in from the af-
ternoon of t − 1, when the shock st was not yet realized. Given this uncertainty,
money may be held for the purpose of conducting transactions and for precautionary
6reasons.
The other constraint is the date−0 nominal intertemporal budget constraint:
∞ ∑
t=0
∫ {
qt(S
t)
[
p1t(S
t)c1t(S
t) + p2t(S
t)c2t(S
t) − wt(S
t)ht(S
t) − Mt(S
t−1)
+ Mt+1(St) − Θt]}dSt ≤ Π + ¯ M
The date−0 sources of funds are ¯ M initial money holdings (=initial liabilities of the
central bank) and the ﬁrm’s nominal value Π. The left hand side is the date−0 present
value of net expenditure. It is calculated by considering the price of money delivered
in the afternoon of t, qt(St). There are two elements:
1. Morning net expenditure: wt(St)ht(St) wages earned, paid in the afternoon;
Mt(St−1)−p1t(St)c1t(St) unspent balances available in the afternoon; p2t(St)c2t(St)
purchases of credit goods settled in the afternoon. These funds are available in
the afternoon of t, where the date-0 value of one dollar is qt(St).
2. Afternoon net expenditures: the household receives Θt transfers and exits the
period holding Mt+1(St) money balances, so net expenditure is Mt+1(St) − Θt,
with date−0 value qt(St).
Given that values can be history-dependent, we integrate over St.
Consumers choose sequences of state-contingent consumption, labor and money
holdings c1t(St), c2t(St), ht(St), and Mt+1(St) to maximize the Lagrangian:
L :=
∞ ∑
t=0
βt ∫
U(c1t(St),c2t(St),ht(St))ft(St)dSt + λ(Π + ¯ M)
−λ
∞ ∑
t=0
∫
{qt(St)[p1t(St)c1t(St) + p2t(St)c2t(St) − wt(St)ht(St)
−Mt(St−1) + Mt+1(St) − Θt]}dSt
+
∞ ∑
t=0
∫
µt(St)[Mt(St−1) − p1t(St)c1t(St)]dSt,
(5)
where µt(St) is the K¨ uhn-Tucker multiplier on the cash constraint on t, given St.
7Omitting the arguments from U and f where understood, in an interior optimum
the FOCs for all t and St are:
c1t(St) : βtU1ft(St) − λp1t(St)qt(St) − µt(St)p1t(St) = 0
p1t(St)c1t(St) ≤ Mt(St−1)
c2t(St) : βtU2ft(St) − λp2t(St)qt(St) = 0
ht(St) : βtU3ft(St) + λwt(St)qt(St) = 0
Mt+1(St) : −λqt(St) + λ
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1 +
∫
µt+1(St+1)dst+1 = 0.
(6)
Given p2t(St) = p1t(St) = p(St) and (4) we get
U3
U2
= F
′(ht(S
t);S
t) for all t,S
t
U1
U2
=
λqt(St) + µt(St)
λqt(St)
for all t,S
t. (7)
2.2 Risk-free rate and Central Bank constraint
Fix t and St. The (reciprocal of the) nominal risk-free interest rate on a bond sold in
the afternoon of t is 1
1+rt(St). This is the price of a claim to money (bought on date
0) delivered in the afternoon of t + 1 conditional on St (but not on st+1) divided by
the price of a claim to money delivered in the afternoon of t conditional on St:
1
1 + rt(St)
:=
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1
qt(St)
=
λ
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1
λ
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1 +
∫
µt+1(St+1)dst+1
, (8)
where the second step comes from the last line in (6).2
From (7), the interest rate makes households indiﬀerent between buying money
or risk-free bonds in the afternoon of t. With cash the consumer can buy either cash-
or credit-goods in t + 1; by holding bonds, he can only buy credit goods, as bonds
2No-arbitrage requires that expenditures in period 0 are equivalent. The household can spend
qt(St) 1
1+rt(St) to buy 1
1+rt(St) delivered on t conditional on St, and then reinvest on t the receipts
in a risk-free bond to get 1 good on date t+1. Alternatively, the agent can spend
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1
on date 0 to have one unit on date t + 1, given St.
8mature in the afternoon of t+1. So, the interest rate compensates consumers for the
bond’s illiquidity, which is why µt+1 appears in the denominator of (8). Substituting
qt(St) = (1 + rt(St))
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1 in the last line of (6) we get
(1 + rt(S
t))
∫
qt+1(S
t+1)dst+1 =
∫
qt+1(S
t+1)dst+1 +
1
λ
∫
µt+1(S
t+1)dst+1.
This is simply an indiﬀerence condition between buying an illiquid bond or holding
money. The expected beneﬁt from buying a risk-free bond in the afternoon of t that
pays one dollar in the afternoon of t + 1 is (1 + rt(St))
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1. Money
has the lower expected value
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1, but provides the liquidity premium
1
λ
∫
µt+1(St+1)dst+1 because, unlike the bond, a dollar worth of money can be spent
in the morning of t + 1 to buy cash goods.
Let ¯ M ≥ 0 be the initial money supply. In the afternoon of t, the central bank
issues ¯ Mt+1 money, valued at qt(St) in date−0 prices, and retires it in the afternoon
of t + 1, when the expected value of money is
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1. Money is injected
via lump-sum transfers Θt valued at qt(St). The date−0 budget constraint is
¯ M =
∞ ∑
t=0
∫
{ ¯ Mt+1 [qt(St) −
∫
qt+1(St+1)dst+1] − Θtqt(St)}dSt.
Equivalently, the ﬂow constraint ¯ Mt+1− ¯ Mt = Θt for all t,St identify monetary policy.
3 Juxtaposing the two models
To compare the LW model and the cash-in-advance model, we utilize the feature that
the LW model can be reduced to a single diﬀerence equation [7, p. 469].
3.1 The main equation in the LW model
Agents in [7] alternate between two markets: decentralized (DM) and centralized
(CM). First, the DM opens and DM goods are traded and then the CM opens and
CM goods are traded. CM markets are Walrasian; in the DM there is pairwise
trade with Nash bargaining and an agent has equal probability δ ≤ 1/2 (using our
9notation see also the Appendix) to buy with money or to sell for money, so the ratio
of buyers to sellers is one (assume no barter). Preferences are additively separable
with quasilinear labor disutility:
U(c1,c2,h1,h2) = u1(c1) − η(h1) + u2(c2) − h2, (9)
where h1 and h2 denote labor eﬀort in DM and CM, c1 and c2 denote consumption in
DM and CM. It is assumed that u1,u2,η are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing, u1 and u2 are concave, η is convex and u1(0) = η(0) = 0; furthermore,
there exists c∗
j ∈ R++ for j = 1,2 such that u′
1(c∗
1) = η′(c∗
1) and u′
2(c∗
2) = 1 with
u2(c∗
2) > c∗
2.
We now discuss equilibrium in the LW model.3 From [7, p.469], on each t equilib-
rium consumption of CM goods satisﬁes
u
′
2(c2) = 1. (10)
Let θ ∈ (0,1] denote the buyer’s bargaining power. From [7, eq. (17)], in equilibrium
p1tc1t = Mt where DM consumption satisﬁes
1
p2t
=
β
p2,t+1
[
δu
′
1(c1,t+1)
1
z′(c1,t+1;θ)
+ 1 − δ
]
, (11)
with p2t =
Mt
z(c1t;θ)
and, using [7, eq. (8)] and omitting the time subscript
z(c1;θ) :=
θη(c1)u′
1(c1) + (1 − θ)u1(c1)η′(c1)
θu′
1(c1) + (1 − θ)η′(c1)
.
Equations (10) and (11) determine equilibrium consumption in the LW model.
Consider a stationary equilibrium in which money grows at a constant rate γ ≥ β,
and consumption and real money balances are constant. The inﬂation rate also equals
3The equilibrium concept is a “blend of traditional Arrow-Debreu components describing aggre-
gates as functions of time t and recursive components describing individuals’ problems as functions
of t and individual state variables” [7, footnote 3].
10γ, rt = r =
γ
β
− 1 and the LW model reduces to the equation
u′
1(c1)
z′(c1;θ)
= 1 +
r
δ
. (12)
The key observation is that the DM pricing schedule is nonlinear due to bargaining,
so the marginal beneﬁt from spending one more dollar is
u′
1(c1)
z′(c1;θ); instead, we would
have
u′
1(c1)
p1/p2 under linear pricing, with p1/p2 = η′(c1) ≤ z′(c1;θ).4 Such price distortion
is measured by the ratio
ψ(c1,θ) :=
η′(c1)
z′(c1;θ)
,
where ψ(c1,1) = 1 (no distortion) and ψ(c1,θ) < 1 for θ < 1. Figure 1 illustrates
that the price distortion depends on θ.
3.2 Model consistency
To present a meaningful comparison, preferences, technologies, and shocks in the cash-
in-advance model must conform to those in the LW model. This section discusses how
this logical coherence is achieved.
Technologies: Let F(h) = h as in the LW model. Since the marginal product of
labor is ﬁxed and independent of St, it is convenient (and without loss in generality)
to interpret production of goods 1 and 2 as occurring in two batches. The ﬁrm chooses
hF
jt (= labor demanded to produce good j = 1,2) and cF
jt (= supply) to solve
Maximize:
∞ ∑
t=0
qt(St)[p1t(St)cF
1t + p2t(St)cF
2t − w1t(St)hF
1t − w2t(St)hF
2t]
subject to: cF
2t = hF
1t and cF
1t = hF
1t.
Substituting the constraints, the FOCs are
pjt(St) − wjt(St) = 0 for all t and j = 1,2. (13)
4If θ = 1, then z′ = η′. If θ < 1 we have z′ > η′. Indeed, u′
1 ≥ η′; hence, θu′
1 + (1 − θ)η′ < u′
1.
From the deﬁnition of z(c1;θ) we have z′ =
u
′
1
θu′
1+(1−θ)η′η′ + A where A > 0.
11Prices equal marginal cost and proﬁts are zero, so Π = 0.
Preferences and shocks: Let st be an i.i.d. shock such that in each t a randomly
drawn portion δ ∈ (0,1) of households desires good 1 and produces it. Hence,
f
t(S
t) = f
t(st;S
t−1) = f(st)f
t−1(S
t−1) for all t ≥ 0,
where f denotes the distribution of the date-t shock. Here st = (si
t)all i where
s
i
t =

 
 
1 with probability δ
0 with probability 1 − δ
for all t ≥ 0 and all agents i
where si
t = 0 means that household i neither derives utility from consuming good 1 nor
can produce it. For any agent i, the marginal probabilities are thus
∫
f(st)1{si
t=0}dst =
1 − δ and
∫
f(st)1{si
t=1}dst = δ.
Assume preferences (9), where hi
jt is labor supplied by household i to produce
good j = 1,2. For household i on date t we have:
U(c1t,c2t,h1t,h2t) = [u1(c
i
1t) − η(h
i
1t)]1{si
t=1} + u2(c
i
2t) − h
i
2t. (14)
Price distortion: A parsimonious way to match the price distortion ψ(c1,θ) is to
introduce a proportional tax either on sales or purchases involving cash goods. For
example, assume that a share 1−τ of revenue from cash-sales taken as given must
be rebated back to the ﬁrm’s owners, lump-sum. For mnemonic ease, we refer to τ as
the parameter of a “cash-revenue tax.” The parameter τ distorts the relative price of
cash and credit goods, without altering the model’s structure or equilibrium concept.
In particular, the ﬁrm’s problem is unchanged: we must simply substitute p1tτcF
1t
for p1tcF
1t, so that the ﬁrst order condition for cash goods becomes p1tτ = w1t and
p1t
p2t = w1t
w2t × 1
τ. Because the buyer spends p1tc1t and the seller receives p1tτc1t, we can
interpret p1tc1t(1−τ) as a sales tax and 1
τ −1 as the sales tax rate on cash transactions.
Viewed in this manner, introducing the tax parameter τ does not amount to adding
an unrealistic feature to the model; in fact, sales taxes are commonplace at the state
13and local level in many countries.
3.3 The main result
The literature based on the LW model has almost entirely focused on stationary
equilibrium (one exception is [6]). Consequently, we focus on stationary competitive
equilibrium in the cash-in-advance model; later, we discuss what happens outside the
steady state.
Proposition 1. Consider the cash-in-advance model with preferences, technologies,
and shocks as in the LW model, and a cash-revenue tax with parameter τ. If
τ = ψ(c1,θ), then the equations characterizing stationary competitive equilibrium
in the cash-in-advance model coincide with equations (10) and (12), which character-
ize stationary equilibrium in the LW model. The cash-in-advance model can generate
the same welfare costs of inﬂation as the LW model.
To provide support for this ﬁnding we start by deriving the main equations of
the cash-in-advance model. Consider a generic household i. On date 0, he can
spend qt(St) to buy a claim to one unit of money delivered in the afternoon of t,
contingent on the history St. Let qt be the price of money delivered on t unconditional
on St (= a risk-free discount bond). No-arbitrage requires equal expenditures, i.e.,
qt =
∫
qt(St)dSt. It also implies5
qt(S
t) = qtf
t(S
t).
To keep the discussion focused, suppose τ = 1 (no tax, no price distortion). The
problem of agent i is still given by (5), where we substitute qt(St) = qtft(St), U
from (14), separate the labor choices for each production batch, and set Π = 0 in
the intertemporal budget constraint.6 Household i chooses sequences c1t(St), c2t(St),
5If qt(St) < qtft(St), then qt(˜ St) > qtft(˜ St) for some other state ˜ St since
∫
ft(St)dSt = 1. In
this case, the agent could make large proﬁts with zero net investment by (i) purchasing claims that
pay in state St at a cheap price qt(St), while selling risk-free claims at price qt; and (ii) selling
claims that pay in state ˜ St at a steep price qt(˜ St), while buying risk-free claims at price qt. Thus
non-contingent claims would not be traded at price qt, which is a contradiction.
6In competitive equilibrium the ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts and since τ = 1 households get no rebate
on cash purchases. Therefore, the value of holding the ﬁrm, Π, must be zero.
14h1t(St), h2t(St) and Mt+1(St) to maximize:
Li :=
∞ ∑
t=0
βt ∫
U(c1t(St),c2t(St),h1t(St),h2t(St))ft(St)dSt + λ ¯ M
−λ
∞ ∑
t=0
∫
qtft(St){[p1t(St)c1t(St) + p2t(St)c2t(St) − w1t(St)h1t(St)
−w2t(St)h2t(St) − Mt(St−1) + Mt+1(St) − Θt]}dSt
+
∞ ∑
t=0
∫
µt(St)[Mt(St−1) − p1t(St)c1t(St)]dSt.
(15)
The FOCs, for all t and St, are
c1t(St) : βtu′
1(c1t(St))ft(St) − λp1t(St)qtft(St) − µt(St)p1t(St) = 0 for si
t = 1
p1t(St)c1t(St) ≤ Mt(St−1),
c2t(St) : βtu′
2(c2t(St)) − λp2t(St)qt = 0,
h1t(St) : −βtη′(h1t(St)) + λw1t(St)qt = 0, for si
t = 1,
h2t(St) : −βt + λw2t(St)qt = 0,
Mt+1(St) : λqtft(St) = λqt+1ft(St) +
∫
µt+1(St+1)dst+1.
(16)
The last line is derived using qt+1ft+1(St+1) = qt+1f(st+1)ft(St) and noticing that
∫
qt+1f(st+1)ft(St)dst+1 = qt+1ft(St) because
∫
f(st+1)dst+1 = 1 by deﬁnition.
From −βt + λw2t(St)qt = 0 we have that w2t is independent of St and therefore,
using the ﬁrm’s optimality conditions, p2t is independent of St. Since −βt+λw2tqt = 0
and w2t = p2t (from the ﬁrm’s problem), the optimal choice of credit goods in (16)
satisﬁes βtu′
2(c2t(St)) = λp2tqt; this implies
u
′
2(c2t(S
t)) = 1 for all t,S
t,
so c2t(St) = c2 for all t,St and all agents i. This coincides with (10).
Consider cash goods. Their consumption is heterogeneous because for if si
t = 0 for
agent i, then ci
1t(St) = 0; this also implies µt(St) = 0 for agent i because this agent’s
cash constraint does not bind. Now consider si
t = 1. We prove that if an agent desires
15to consume cash goods, then the quantity consumed is independent of the history of
shocks St and of the identity of the agent, i.
Lemma 1. Consider any agent i and let si
t = 1. In competitive equilibrium:
1. If µt(St) = 0, then c1t(St) = c1 for all t,St, with
u′
1(c1)
η′(c1)
= 1.
2. If µt(St) > 0, then c1t(St) =
Mt
p1t
= c1t for all t,St, where c1t satisﬁes
β
p2,t+1
[
δu
′
1(c1,t+1)
1
η′(c1,t+1)
+ 1 − δ
]
−
1
p2t
= 0 for all t, (17)
with p2t =
Mt
η′(c1t)c1t
.
Proof of Lemma 1. See Appendix
On date t, not everyone consumes cash goods (ci
1t = 0 when si
t = 0) but those who
do consume an identical quantity c1t, independent of the history of shocks. Since U is
linear in h2, everyone saves the same amount of money Mt(St−1) = Mt on t−1, there
is a degenerate distribution of money, and prices are history-independent. Clearly, if
µt = 0, then u′
1 = η′ and the agent consumes the eﬃcient quantity c1t = c∗
1. Otherwise,
u′
1 > η′ and c1t = Mt
p1t < c∗
1 (ﬁrst and third equations in (16) with p1t = w1t).
Using the risk-free interest rate deﬁned in (8), we have
1
1 + rt
=
∫
qt+1(S
t+1)dst+1
qt(St)
=
qt+1ft(St)
qtft(St)
=
β
πt
.
The second equality holds by substituting qt(St) = qtft(St) and noting that qt+1ft+1(St+1) =
qt+1f(st+1)ft(St) so that
∫
qt+1f(st+1)ft(St)dst+1 = qt+1ft(St) because
∫
f(st+1)dst+1 =
1. To perform the ﬁnal step substitute
βtu′
2(c2t)
λp2t = qt from (16), use u′
2(c2t) = 1, and
deﬁne the gross inﬂation rate πt :=
p2,t+1
p2t .
Now let Mt+1 = γMt and consider stationary equilibrium with
Mt+1
p2,t+1 = Mt
p2t,
p2,t+1
p2t =
γ and rt = r =
γ
β − 1 for all t. Equation (17) yields
u′
1 (c1)
η′(c1)
=
r
δ
+ 1. (18)
16The only diﬀerence between (18) and (12) is given by the price distortion in the LW
model. Due to linear pricing, the marginal beneﬁt from spending one more dollar on
cash goods is
u′
1(c1)
p1/p2
where p1/p2 = η′(c1) in equilibrium.
Now note that equation (18) coincides with (12) when θ = 1, since z′ = η′; intu-
itively, sellers are price-takers in both models.7 Otherwise, when θ < 1, it does not
because z′ > η′, i.e., Nash bargaining induces a price distortion. This is evidence
that the two frameworks’ diﬀerences, in terms of stationary equilibrium allocations,
reduce to diﬀerences in assumptions about the pricing mechanism that governs those
transactions that must be settled with the exchange of money. One wonders whether
the distortion generated by the Nash bargaining solution can be reproduced by intro-
ducing a cash-revenue tax in the cash-in-advance model.
Re-introduce the cash-revenue tax parameter τ ≤ 1. The households’ problem is
(15).8 The FOCs are in (16), so the model still reduces to the diﬀerence equation
(17). However, in stationary equilibrium relative prices are
p1
p2
=
η′(h1)
τ
, so we obtain
u′
1 (c1)
η′(c1)/τ
= 1 +
r
δ
.
This equation coincides with (12) if τ = ψ(c1,θ), which is when the cash-revenue tax in
equilibrium reproduces the price distortion induced by Nash bargaining. The lesson is
that, in stationary equilibrium, diﬀerences in the frameworks’ main equations reduce
to the price distortion due to bargaining. Such distortion can be replicated in the
cash-in-advance model with an appropriate “tax” on revenues from cash transactions.
The result partially extends to non-stationary equilibrium.
Corollary 1. If η satisﬁes
dlnη(h)
dlnh = κ > 0 and θ = 1, then the equations character-
izing non-stationary competitive equilibrium in the cash-in-advance model coincide
with (10) and (11), which characterize non-stationary equilibrium in the LW model.
7Clearly, the two equations coincide if DM goods are traded on competitive markets, as in [1,2,14].
8The only diﬀerence is Π appears in the agent’s budget constraint—as it did in (5)—due to
lump-sum rebates from the ﬁrm. In equilibrium we have Π =
∞ ∑
t=0
∫
qtft(St)TtdSt where the rebate
Tt = p1,t(1 − τ)c1tδ on t.
17The result immediately follows from Lemma 1. Rewrite equation (17) as
η′(c1t)c1t
Mt
= β
η′(c1,t+1)c1,t+1
Mt+1
[
u′
1 (c1,t+1)
η′(c1,t+1)
δ + 1 − δ
]
,
and note that it coincides with (11) when θ = 1 and
dlnη(h)
dlnh = κ, because p2t = Mt
η(c1t)
(since z(c1;1) = η(c1)) and η′(c1)c1 = κη(c1). Both η linear and the common isoelastic
formulation η(h) = hx
x for x > 1 satisfy
dlnη(h)
dlnh = κ. The correspondence between the
equations characterizing non-stationary allocations in the two models breaks down
when θ < 1. Again, the diﬀerence in allocations reduce to diﬀerences in assumptions
about the pricing mechanism that governs those transactions that must be settled
with the exchange of money.9 Hence, there may exist equilibria which are not the
same in the two models.
3.4 Quantitative comparison
To evaluate possible quantitative diﬀerences between the cash-in-advance model and
the LW model, we adopt the speciﬁcation in [7, Table 1], which considers stationary
equilibrium in the model calibrated to annual U.S. data.
Preferences over goods are deﬁned by
u1(c1) =
(c1 + b)
1−a − b1−a
1 − a
and u2(c2) = B logc2,
for some a > 0, b ∈ (0,1) and B > 0. Consumption c2 satisﬁes (10), labor disutility
satisﬁes η′ = 1, so c1 satisﬁes
γ
β
− 1 = δ[τu
′
1(c1) − 1]. (19)
Deﬁne ex-ante welfare
Wγ := u2(c2) − c2 + δ[u1(c1(γ)) − c1(γ)].
9The equations characterizing non-stationary allocations coincide when DM goods are priced
competitively.
18Considering the compensating variation ∆, welfare at zero inﬂation is denoted
W1 := u2(∆c2) − c2 + δ[u1(∆c1(1)) − c1].
The welfare cost of γ −1 inﬂation is the value 1−∆ where ∆ satisﬁes W1 −Wγ = 0.
In [7, p.475], θ is calibrated to match the average price markup in U.S. data; the
markup is
z(c1;θ)
c1η′(c1), i.e., the ratio of the DM good price p1 to marginal cost.10 In our
model the markup is
p1
w1 = 1
τ ≡
z′(c1;θ)
η′(c1) because we match the price distortion in the
LW model by setting τ = ψ(c1;θ) and use the calibrated value of θ from the LW
model. Hence, the markups in the two model generally do not coincide.
Table 1 compares results for the cash-in-advance and the LW model, in ﬁve diﬀer-
ent cases. Panel 1 shows that the cash-in-advance model can yield identical consump-
tion as in [7, Table 1]. Panel 2 reports average price markups, at each inﬂation rate;
the average markups are comparable. Fixing the parameter θ, average markups in-
crease with inﬂation in both models; if we interpret 1
τ −1 as the sales tax rate on cash
trades, then the model does not imply unreasonable average sales tax rates.11 Panel
3 shows that the cash-in-advance model can yield identical welfare cost of inﬂation
as in the LW model.
In a nutshell, the cash-in-advance model can replicate the same, large welfare cost
of inﬂation found in the LW mod7el, once price distortions are accounted for (cases
3-4). This suggests that the diﬀerence in the assumed pricing mechanisms is primarily
10It varies with the bargaining power and it generally varies with c1 (but not always; consider
η(h) = h
x
x , x ≥ 1and θ = 1). In the calibration labor disutility is linear so the markup coincides
with the relative price
p1
p2, which is
z(c1;θ)
c1 .
11The share of DM output in the LW model is easily constructed, given that in the calibrated
model everyone is matched in the DM (α = 1 in the LW model). DM output is δc1 and CM output
is c2 ≡ B, in the calibrated model. Hence, total output is Y = δc1 + B and the DM output share
is δc1
Y (it increases as inﬂation falls because real money balances increase); this also gives us the
share of cash goods to total goods in the cash-in-advance model. This share is used to calculate
average markups. In the calibration, when θ = 0.5 we have τ = ψ(c1;θ) = .719,.846,.928 for,
respectively, γ = .1,0,
1−β
β ; the corresponding average sales tax rates are: .025,.037,.034. Instead,
when θ = 0.343, we have τ = ψ(c1;θ) = .511,.672,.802; the corresponding average sales tax rates
are: .014,.019,.013. As inﬂation decreases the markup in cash trades, 1
τ , falls; yet, the average
markup increases because the share of cash goods to total output rises.
19Table 1: Quantitative comparison with the LW model
Parameter case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4 case 5
δ(≡ ασ) .31 .5 .5 .5 .5
a(≡ η) .27 .16 .30 .30 .30
B 2.13 1.97 1.91 1.78 1.78
θ 1 1 .5 .343 1
Inﬂation Panel 1: Equilibrium c1
0.1 .243 .206 .143 .094 .523
0 .638 .618 .442 .296 .821
β−1 − 1 1 1 .779 .568 1
Panel 2: Average markup
0.1 0 0 {.056,.050} {.049,.050} 0
0 0 0 {.141,.123} {.123,.114} 0
β−1 − 1 0 0 {.213,.183} {.196,.172} 0
Panel 3: Welfare cost of 10% inﬂation
0 .014 .014 .032 .046 .012
β−1 − 1 .016 .016 .042 .068 .013
Notes to Table 1: The comparison involves the calibration in [7, Table 1]. The Parameters
column reports our notation (the corresponding notation from [7], when diﬀerent from ours,
is reported in parentheses). In both models c2 = B in equilibrium and β−1 = 1.04. The
inﬂation rate is γ − 1. When numbers are diﬀerent in the two models we report them as
the pair {LW, cash-in-advance}.
what lies behind the dissimilarities in quantitative results between the two models,
and not the explicit microfoundation for money in the LW model as opposed to the
reduced-form approach of the other model.
4 Final comments
We have examined two monetary models characterized by periodic interactions in
centralized and decentralized markets: the cash-in-advance model, and the model
in [7]. Prices are linear in the former but are non-linear in the latter when trades
must be settled with the exchange of cash, due to Nash bargaining. Our analysis
indicates that this is the one diﬀerence that matters.
When the models are placed on equal footing in terms of preferences, technologies
20and shocks, both models reduce to a single equation describing stationary equilib-
rium. The equations coincide when sellers have no bargaining power. Otherwise, the
equations diﬀer in just one element the price distortion from bargaining. Yet, such
distortion can be replicated in the cash-in-advance model using a proportional tax.
For simplicity, we have considered a tax on cash revenues, in which case allocations
and welfare costs of inﬂation are comparable in stationary equilibrium.
Our ﬁndings neither rely on altering the market structure of the LW model, nor
the equilibrium concept or the basic structure of the cash-in-advance model. The
analysis should neither be taken to imply that nothing can be done with one model,
which could not be done with the other, nor that the models are identical. In fact,
our analysis has emphasized the central role played by assumptions about the pricing
mechanisms presumed to govern cash-based trades in the two models.
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22Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider an equilibrium with history-independent prices p1t(St) = p1t and w1t(St) =
w1t, as in [7].12 To prove the ﬁrst part of the Lemma let si
t = 1 and µt(St) = 0. From
the ﬁrst and third expressions in (16) we have
β
tu
′
1(c1t(S
t)) = λp1tqt = λw1tqt = β
tη
′(h1t(S
t)), for all t,S
t,
From market clearing hF
1t(St) = δh1t(St) = δc1t(St) = cF
1t(St).13 Hence,
u′
1(c1t(St))
η′(c1t(St)) = 1
for all t,St. That is c1t(St) = c1 for all t and all agents i such that si
t = 1.
To prove the second part of the Lemma let si
t = 1 and µt(St) > 0. Update by one
period the ﬁrst expression in the FOCs (16) to get
βt+1
p1,t+1
u
′
1(c1,t+1(S
t+1))f(st+1)f
t(S
t) = λqt+1f(st+1)f
t(S
t) + µt+1(S
t+1), if s
i
t+1 = 1
where we substituted ft+1(St+1) = f(st+1)ft(St). Now substitute c1,t+1(St+1) =
Mt+1(St+1)
p1,t+1 since µt+1(St+1) > 0. The expression above has the status of an equality
only if si
t+1 = 1. In that case, we can integrate both sides with respect to st+1,
conditional on si
t+1 = 1. For the left-hand-side we get
βt+1
p1,t+1
∫
1{si
t+1=1}u
′
1(c1,t+1(S
t+1))f(st+1)f
t(S
t)dst+1
=
βt+1
p1,t+1
u′
1
(
Mt+1(St)
p1,t+1
)∫
1{si
t+1=1}f(st+1)f
t(S
t)dst+1
=
βt+1
p1,t+1
u′
1
(
Mt+1(St)
p1,t+1
)
ft(St)
∫
1{si
t+1=1}f(st+1)dst+1
=
βt+1
p1,t+1
u′
1
(
Mt+1(St)
p1,t+1
)
ft(St)δ
(20)
12Prices and wages will not depend on the history St here if the distribution of money holdings is
degenerate at the start of each period t, which we will prove to be the case.
13Under linear labor disutility, households are indiﬀerent to how much labor h1 they supply at
the given wage w1. In that case, we consider symmetric choices, i.e., every household supplies the
same labor eﬀort. This is as in [7].
23For the right-hand-side we get
∫
1{si
t+1=1}[λqt+1f(st+1)f
t(S
t) + µt+1(S
t+1)]dst+1
= λqt+1ft(St) +
∫
µt+1(St+1)dst+1 − Φ = λqtft(St) − Φ,
(21)
where the last step follows from the last line in (16) and
Φ :=
∫
1{si
t+1=0}[λqt+1f(st+1)f
t(S
t) + µt+1(S
t+1)]dst+1
=
∫
1{si
t+1=0}[λqt+1f(st+1)f
t(S
t)]dst+1, since µt+1(S
t+1) = 0 when s
i
t+1 = 0
= λqt+1ft(St)
∫
1{si
t+1=0}f(st+1)dst+1
= λqt+1ft(St)(1 − δ), since
∫
1{si
t+1=0}f(st+1)dst+1 = 1 − δ
= βt+1u′
2(c2,t+1)
p2,t+1
ft(St)(1 − δ), from (16).
Equating the expectations of both sides from (20) and (21) we have
βt+1
p1,t+1
u
′
1
(
Mt+1(St)
p1,t+1
)
δ = λqt −
Φ
ft(St)
Substituting Φ in the equation above we get
βt+1
p1,t+1
u
′
1
(
Mt+1(St)
p1,t+1
)
δ = λqt −
βt+1u′
2(c2,t+1)
p2,t+1
(1 − δ),
or equivalently, since u′
2(c2,t+1) = 1 for all t + 1 and St+1, we have
β
t+1
[
u
′
1
(
Mt+1(St)
p1,t+1
)
δ
p1,t+1
+
1 − δ
p2,t+1
]
= λqt.
This implies that if si
t+1 = 1, then c1,t+1(St+1) =
Mt+1(St)
p1,t+1 =
Mt+1
p1,t+1 = c1,t+1 for all
t and St and for all agents i, because qt is independent of St. The distribution of
money is degenerate because there are no wealth eﬀects due to the linear disutility
from producing credit goods. Households equally reach the same cash holdings by
adjusting their labor supply hi
2. By market clearing, hF
2t =
∫
hi
2tdi = c2t where hi
2t
24satisﬁes the agents’ budget constraint.
Now substitute λqt =
βtu′
2(c2t)
p2t
=
βt
p2t
from (16) and write the equation above as
(17). Finally, from the ﬁrm’s problem, we have η′(h1t) = w1t
w2t =
p1t
p2t. 
Comparing notations in [7] and in our model
In [7], U(X) is the utility received from consuming X CM goods (u2(c2) in our
notation). The technology to produce CM goods is linear and the disutility from
labor is linear. In the DM, a portion ασ (δ in our notation) of agents desires to
consume (but cannot produce) and an identical portion can produce but does not
consume; u(q) is the utility received from consuming q DM goods (u1(c1) in our
notation); c is the disutility from labor in the DM (η in our notation); the nominal
price is
d
q
per unit of consumption (p1 in our notation); the real price is
ϕd
q
, where
ϕ is
1
p2
in our notation. With binding cash constraints d = M and
ϕM
q
where M is
the agent’s money holdings. We also have ϕM ≡ z(q) where 0 < θ ≤ 1 is the buyer’s
bargaining power. The nominal interest rate is i (r in our notation).
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